Business Conflict Blog
Our friend Giuseppe De Palo reports that the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee (“JURI”) will discuss mediation again at the February 26, 2015, ‘Civil Law & Justice Forum’ in Brussels, and the ADR Center has been asked to present a follow-up to its 2014 study, “Rebooting the Mediation Directive.”
The Center has prepared a survey that will be the basis for its presentation, and seeks to have as many and as varied people as possible complete it. The short mediation survey can be found at this link: https://it.surveymonkey.com/s/77T6PKK. All those in the EU who are interested in ADR are encouraged to fill out the survey and encourage others to do so.
The ABA Business Law Section is partnering with New York Law School to present a half-day CLE Symposium on “ADR and the Young Lawyer” on Friday morning, January 30.
The event, held from 9:00 to 1:45, features speakers from leading corporations, law firms and ADR institutions, and advises lawyers on how competency in ADR skills can assist them in creating distinctive careers and practices. 3.0 CLE credits are offered and both breakfast and lunch are offered.
The Keynote speaker will be Paulette Brown, President-Elect of the ABA.
Information and registration can be found here.
A while ago I was engaged to assist two partners who had worked since their college years to build up a very successful business. Now, more than 25 years later, they could barely be in the same room with each other, and wanted help in finding a way out.
Just the other day, I opened the first page of Stephen H. Knee’s book, Business Divorce, and found this problem described:
Two individuals form a business. One has expertise in the normal back-office functions, the other is a great salesperson. Over the years, one of the individuals begins to feel that she is contributing much more to the business than the other individual and that is unfair, because both are drawing the same salary and are 50-50 owners. The resentment results in the individuals barely communicating with each other and adversely affects the performance of the business. The decision-making process becomes deadlocked — the resentment builds until there is an event that pushes the first individual over the cliff. The battle has begun.
Stephen Knee, where were ya when I needed ya??
This is one of those thin books — barely 100 pages — that you wonder how you did without all these years. The author has simple and straightforward advice for drafters of partnership, LLC and other similar agreements, that emphasize the importance of buy-sell provisions, triggering events, dispute resolution provisions, disputed valuations, and tax considerations. Psychologist Jane M. Sullivan writes about the inescapable dynamics of closely-held businesses, which often dominate the process of business divorce far more than economic or legal considerations. Knee reminds us, too, that an ADR specialist is not the only essential consultant in a business divorce — legal, accounting, business and even psychological insight is often appropriate in order to fashion a break-up agreement that is mutually satisfactory and sustainable.
In characteristically straightforward writing, Knee addresses the legal ethics of lawyers’ consulting in business breakups, citing the caution in the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), that the consulting lawyer “determine at the outset who the professional is representing and advise the other parties to retain their own professionals.” And he gives an illustrative laundry list of legal and other issues that are implicated in the break-up process: handling existing obligations of the entity, settling the owners’ non-monetary benefits like health and life insurance; addressing contingent liabilities such as pending or threatened litigation, managing dissenters’ rights in corporations, and a host of other issues such as union contracts, regulatory and environmental concerns, government filings, and (by contributor Kenneth G. Hydock) tax treatment of the dissolution transactions.
In such a complex context, the use of ADR processes to resolve issues that are not agreed upon, while specifically and intelligently addressed, seems almost an afterthought, however necessary.
This is a great guidebook, one that can be (and clearly must be) reviewed before any of us venture into the mine-laden fields of assisting individuals in managing business break-ups.
Professor Stacie Strong of the University of Missouri has announced a student writing competition to prompt critical thinking on the dispute resolution ramifications of the events surrounding the killing in Ferguson, Missouri and elsewhere. The details of the competition are below. It will be interesting to see what examples of rigorous critical thinking this initiative prompts.
Please consider forwarding this information to students and law schools with which you may be connected. The window is brief — submissions must be received by February 13, 2015.CALL: The University of Missouri Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution is pleased to announce a student writing competition that is being organized in conjunction with the Missouri Law Review annual symposium, entitled “Policing, Protesting, and Perceptions: A Critical Examination of the Events in Ferguson.” The symposium, which will feature speakers and works-in-progress participants from around the country, addresses recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, as well as similar developments from around the nation. The writing competition features a $700 prize for the competition winner, a $100 prize for the second place winner and an honorable mention for the third place winner. Prizes are sponsored by the University of Missouri Chancellor’s Diversity Initiative and private funding through the Missouri Law Foundation. Topic Submissions must bear some relationship to the upcoming Missouri Law School symposium entitled “Policing, Protesting, and Perceptions: A Critical Examination of the Events in Ferguson.” Papers can consider the events in Ferguson and elsewhere in the nation from the perspective of civil rights, police-community relationships, police perceptions of individuals, protests and/or civil disobedience. Essays can be historical (for example, submissions could consider the history of the legal response to social unrest in this country, dating back to the 1968 Kerner Commission report to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in the wake of the Watts Riots), process-oriented (for example, authors could analyze the evolution and legitimacy of hearings in front of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights) or psycho-social in nature (for example, papers could discuss the value of having a forum in which to speak and be heard). All submissions must incorporate either a conflict resolution (sometimes called “peace studies”) or dispute resolution perspective so as to provide some guidance on how to address the outstanding problems and tensions in a useful manner. For example, authors might consider whether and to what extent communities might wish to adopt certain procedures that are often seen in dispute resolution (such as mediation or conciliation) in order to facilitate discussions with local police forces. Alternatively, authors can take look at the genesis of the problem using a conflict studies/peace studies approach. Eligibility The writing competition is open to all persons enrolled on February 1, 2015, in an ABA-accredited law school to pursue a degree in law (including the J.D., LL.B., LL.M. or S.J.D.). Applicants may be of any nationality. Papers that have been accepted for publication elsewhere are not eligible for the writing competition. Submission Requirements Submissions must be in English and should be between 2,500 and 3,500 words in length. The style of the paper will be that of a long “op-ed” (opinion editorial) piece. However, the strongest submissions will include references to legal authorities as necessary. Any citations should appear in the body of the submission and will be included in the total word count. The text of the paper must be typed with double spaced pages in 12 point Times New Roman font (or similarly legible typeface) and 1-inch margins. The title of the paper must appear on every page of the submission. The author’s name must not appear anywhere on the submission itself. A separate document should be provided including (1) the author’s full name, address, telephone number and email address; (2) the degree-granting institution where the author is enrolled, as well as the degree sought and the anticipated year of graduation; (3) the title of the submission; and (4) the date of the submission. Papers must be electronically submitted to:
Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution University of Missouri School of Law
email@example.com Papers must be received no later than 11:59 p.m., Central time, on February 13, 2015. Late papers and papers that do not comply with the submission requirements will not be considered by the selection committee. Criteria Submissions will be judged anonymously by the selection committee. The following factors will be considered: Legal analysis
- Thoroughness and depth in addressing the topic, particularly with respect to dispute resolution and/or conflict resolution issues
- Awareness of significant literature and authorities in this field
- Contribution to the current debate on this topic
University of Missouri School of Law
There may be some serious ADR practitioners who have not heard of Tom Stipanowich’s recent articles analyzing the results of the CCA survey on trends in commercial arbitration. And for those few folks, I copy Tom’s note to me, along with the links:
We are pleased to announce the publication of two articles that present extensive new data on practices and trends in commercial arbitration, including results from and analysis of a groundbreaking empirical survey of perceptions and practices among experienced arbitrators.
Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals and its companion piece, Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced Arbitrators, will soon be published in Columbia’s American Review of International Arbitration. However, they may now be accessed at the following SSRN links:
These articles contain new information and insights on many different aspects of commercial arbitration practice in the U.S. and in international disputes. Topics include the habits and attitudes of business users and their attorneys; barriers to making effective choices regarding arbitration; standards for arbitrator decision making and methods of managing perceived risks in arbitration (including appellate arbitration, final offer arbitration and other alternatives); the variety of proactive approaches now employed to promote economy and efficiency in arbitration; the handling of pre-hearing motion practice and discovery; management of hearings; issues of diversity in arbitration tribunals (including the gender and the professional background of arbitrators); perceptions of party-appointed arbitrators on tripartite panels; the dramatic growth in the ranks of self-described “dispute resolution professionals”; the education, training and credentialing of arbitrators; legal advocacy in arbitration; arbitrators and settlement; the impact of mediation on arbitration and arbitrators; the growing emphasis on early evaluation or case assessment; the impact of technology; and the insights drawn from behavioral science and “big data.”
Tom is richly informative but — it must be said — seldom concise, which is fine for us Wagnerians As I tell my wife when I embark to Seattle or Bayreuth for a Ring Cycle, some stories take a while to tell. And Tom and his colleagues tell this story better than anyone. So over the holiday break, light the fire, get some cocoa, and enjoy the peerless company of Tom Stipanowich.
The recent confluence of my Conflict Transformation work with the New York Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends (Quakers) and the richly rewarding session offered by David Hoffman at the April 2014 Meeting of the ABA Dispute Resolution Section have made me increasingly aware of the moral component of non-adjudicative conflict resolution. I was mentioning this to a colleague, Jon Hyman of Rutgers, who no sooner blinked than popped me over a real tasty paper that is about to be published by Nevada Law Journal.
Titled Beyond Fairness: The Place of Moral Foundations Theory in Mediation and Negotiation, the paper’s argument is set forth by its author as follows:
Intuitive moral judgments pervade mediation and negotiation but are not well understood or managed. People usually experience them in terms of “fairness.” A sense of unfairness can fuel a conflict or prevent an agreement; a sense of being treated fairly, or presented with fair terms, can close a deal. Despite the ubiquity of moral judgments, negotiators and mediators have generally not articulated a coherent and explicit way to deal with them. Moral Foundations Theory, developed by psychologist Jonathan Haidt and colleagues, provides an intriguing means to do so. Rather than relying on some general sense of fairness, Moral Foundations Theory disaggregates moral judgments into six distinct mental modules: Fairness/Cheating; Care/Harm; Loyalty/Betrayal; Authority/Subversion; Sanctity/Degradation; and Liberty/Oppression. Particular moral judgments might be located along one or more of these scales.
In this paper, I explore ways in which Moral Foundations Theory sheds light on mediation and negotiation. I identify the modules at work in a variety of mediations and negotiations that have been described in the literature. In some, we notice that moral modules – in addition to Fairness/Cheating – explain surprising shifts from opposition to agreement. The modules even help explain the enduring attractiveness of value-creating, interest-based negotiation, since that approach requires some care for the other, to try to meet their needs, rather than just imposing a harmful loss on them, as strictly distributive, competitive negotiation often does.
Moral Foundations Theory remains contested. Is the concept of mental modules, on which it depends, viable? Are there exactly six modules, and are these six the right ones? Can we adequately understand the modules in vivo? Nevertheless, accepting it as a plausible tool, and contingent on its further development, it can provide mediators and negotiators with greater insight into the dynamics of the conflicts they face. Moreover, it can reveal opportunities to ameliorate strong negative moral intuitions and thus provide a clearer path to agreement.
When we facilitate others’ resolution processes, we all wish that we were neutral in every sense, and that as professionals we create neutral environments in which disputants are invited to perceive self-interested outcomes. Yet the process of conflict facilitation necessarily forbids moral neutrality, the same way that not every article in the New York Times front page can appear above the fold. I commend this work to all whose curiosity leads them into these uncomfortable forests.
Jean-Claude Najar has labored in the fields for General Electric in such onerous assignments as Florence and Paris. He nevertheless maintained his good cheer, and from his new position as international counsel at Curtis, Mallet-Provost, Colt & Mosle he has contributed a terse and sane statement of best practices, appearing in the September 2014 edition of IBA’s publication Business Law International. The title is Corporate Counsel in the Era of Dispute Management 2.0.
Najar, his colleague Michael McIlwrath, his former colleague PD Villarreal, and others at General Electric were responsible for pounding into my head two distinctions. The first was the concept of “dispute management” rather than “dispute resolution,” and the other was “Early Dispute Resolution” rather than “Alternative Dispute Resolution.” Pondering the implications of the distinctions they were making — and trying to master the practice of requiring Early Case Assessments from outside counsel — led to an appreciation of commercial conflict practices that has framed my thinking ever since.
In his recent article, Najar credits Villarreal with the perception that “reducing litigation costs would require transforming GE’s legal policy fundamentally,” implicating not only an institutionalized ADR program but “changing how lawyers viewed their role, how the company viewed its legal docket and how managers worked with lawyers to handle disputes.” Najar — quite correctly in my view — cites the resulting realignment as a paradigm for multinational companies involved in the global economy.
Central to the redefinition of the role of the lawyer in the company is the critical concept of conflict management. Disputes conclude either through agreement or adjudication, and the former is far more business-rational (as well as less expensive to accomplish). So companies have evolved, says Najar, to incorporate management of disputes into their culture, for “true pragmatic/economic reasons.” In the case of GE Oil & Gas, Najar hired Michael McIlwrath to “manage” (rather than “prosecute”) the company’s litigation docket, yielding a reduction in large litigations from 143 in 1999 to 25 in 2002. Najar cites such initiatives as the CPR Pledge as prompting efficient, realistic dispute management policies, and the 2013 Fidal/AAA/ICDR survey as documenting their impact.
Increased company involvement in international arbitration proceedings has also been salutary. As the primary users of the process, says Najar, “companies have made real efforts to regain control over their disputes by increasing their involvement in the decision-making process related to arbitration,” arising from the understanding that “arbitration could not be perceived separately from the conflict itself that led to the arbitral process,” and therefore mediation and other conflict management tools played a vital role in the resolution of many disputes.
The key to modern corporate conflict management is “corporate culture, communication and a more horizontal involvement of the legal department.” Early Dispute Resolution protocols act as a “toolkit” encouraging business managers to assess the costs of pending disputes and to consider creative — business-oriented — ways to solve them.Among the resources at the disposal of corporate managers is the newly launched Effective Management of Arbitration: a Guide for In-house Counsel and Other Party Representatives, released 6 June 2014.
Few commentators emphasize, as Najar does, the role of leadership at the highest executive level in order for the culture shift to take place on which change depends. General Electric’s experience continues to act as a rewarding case study.
A recently posted paper, reporting on the results of an empirical study, reveals unsettling facts about consumer understanding of arbitration contracts. Titled “Whimsey Little Contracts” With Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, the paper explores the extent to which consumers are aware of, and understand the effect of, arbitration clauses in connection with their purchases of goods and services.
The authors report “a profound lack of understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration agreements among consumers.” Fewer than half of those surveyed recognized that a sample contract included an arbitration clause, and more than half of those respondents believed that the clause not deprive them of a right to seek judicial redress.
So in whose book is this a contract?
This work — reported by St. John’s Law professors Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Krigis and Yuxiang Liu — deprives any court of the ability to rely upon classic contract theory to enforce these “agreements” by analogy to arbitration agreements that are entered into intentionally between merchants, in collective bargaining agreements, or in other contexts. Put simply, the authors of this paper demonstrate that, as a matter of provable fact, one party to these consumer agreements either doesn’t know that he agreed, or doesn’t know what he agreed to, or (most frequently) both.
The study involved an online survey of 668 consumers. Each was shown a credit card contract with an arbitration clause, and asked eight questions concerning it and about “an imaginary contract containing a ‘properly-worded’ arbitration clause.” The arbitration clause in the contract was printed in bold type and portions appeared in italics and ALLCAPS. The arbitration section was preceded by the sentence “It is important that you read the entire Arbitration Provisions section carefully.” Some findings:
- Only 43% of respondents recognized that the sample contract contained an arbitration clause. A majority of respondents either thought that they had not agreed to arbitrate, or did not know.
- Only 14% of respondents realized that the contract banned litigation in court.
- Less than 9% realized both that the contract had an arbitration clause, and that it would prevent them from suing in court.
- More respondents thought an arbitrator’s decision was not final than thought it was. Less than a fifth realized that the arbitrator’s decision would in fact be final.
- More than 70% failed to realize that the contract prohibited class claims.
The paper contains a very tidy and responsible review of the history of arbitration and the development of American arbitration law. It also includes — most helpfully for the purposes of the survey — data on how few consumers even read sellers’ statements of terms and conditions, much less comprehend them. One study of 45,091 households found that only one or two shoppers out of every thousand access the license agreement when purchasing software. And were they to do so, they would have their work cut out for them; many agreements are of daunting length. Write the authors, “the iTunes contract is reportedly 32 feet long, even when printed in 8 font type.”
The import of this study seems simple and direct: There may be legal foundations for binding a consumer to an agreement to arbitrate in connection with a purchase, but consent is not one.
And as the Supreme Court held in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989), “Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of consent.”
Following up on a prior post, two recent cases have tested the enforceability of “agreements” that one party unilaterally propounded and the other party had no idea existed. Though the Ninth Circuit found both to be non-binding, the logic in both cases implies that knowing consent — an element of contract law that is emphasized in law school as fundamental — seems no longer to be a requirement in “agreeing” to arbitrate future disputes.
In Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, (CTA 9 August 18, 2014), Kevin Nguyen purchased two Touchpads on Barnes & Noble’s website. The order was cancelled “due to unexpectedly high demand” and Nguyen filed a suit in California state court on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, alleging that the company had engaged in deceptive business practices and false advertising. The company removed the action to federal court and moved to compel arbitration.
The second opinion, Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio, (CTA 9 November 10, 2014), involved the purchaser of a Toyota vehicle that included a 90-day subscription to Sirius XM satellite radio. Upon purchasing the vehicle, Knutson began getting telephone calls from Sirius and an unsolicited mailing that included a purported “Customer Agreement.” He brought a class action suit alleging violations by Sirius of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration, based on a provision in the “Customer Agreement” that Sirius had unilaterally drafted and unilaterally sent to Knutson. The “Agreement” provided, among other things, that Knutson would be bound thereby unless he took action to the contrary, and that Sirius could modify the terms of the Agreement by “unilateral amendment.”
Sirius’ Agreement contained a provision requiring Knutson to waive the right to go to court, waive the right to assert claims on a class basis, and submit to binding arbitration. Knutson ignored the Agreement because he did not think he had entered into any legal relationship with Sirius when he purchased his Toyota. The Ninth Circuit agreed, and reversed the district court’s order compelling arbitration.
“Applying well-settled principles of contract law,” the court determined that Knutson had never assented to Sirius’ Customer Agreement. In particular, the court held that Knutson had evidenced no “outward manifestations of consent” that would lead to the conclusion that, as offeree, he had consented to Sirius’ offered terms. Knutson reasonably thought he had entered into a contract only with Toyota and was under no obligation to open, read, or act upon notices provided to him by Sirius. “There was no evidence that Knutson purchased anything from Sirius XM, or ever knew that he was entering into a contractual relationship with [it].”
The legal basis of the court’s conclusion is one that most first year law students would recognize: “A party to a contract cannot be held to the contract’s arbitration provision where the plaintiff does not know a contract exists.”
So far so good. But are we really saying that, if Barnes & Noble repositions its “Terms and Conditions” button, a “clickthrough” purchaser of a book knows that she’s entered into an agreement to arbitrate? Or, if Sirius adjusts its marketing a bit, that the purchaser of a car could be obligated to the radio signal supplier? Has the law of Section 2 of the FAA so devolved that not only is no written consent required, but “clicking” a button or turning on a radio constitutes consent? Is buying a Toyota, or buying a watchband, or visiting a website, an agreement to waive class action rights?
Two questions present themselves: What is sufficient to evidence contractual consent, and how does one determine whether a party knows what she is consenting to? The second question may be framed: “Say you present a purchaser of a gallon of milk with a piece of paper that says that, if she leaves the store with the milk, she must arbitrate any claim against the seller. Does she know what ‘yes’ means?”
That question will be discussed in distressing terms in a subsequent post.
The College of Commercial Arbitrators is perhaps the definitive authoritative body for best practices in commercial arbitration from the perspective of practitioner arbitrators. Its promulgated standards are widely respected and its leaders are leaders of leaders.
It is therefore with great satisfaction that I note that the CCA has selected its first female President, Deborah Rothman.
Deborah’s being the first female President of this prestigious organization is of a piece with her life and career. She was the first person in her family to go to college and, therefore, to go to law school and, therefore, to practice law. She was a segregation-breaker as a participant in the first-ever small-scale exchange of college students to test the impact of coeducation on their single-sex schools, and was one of 10 Vassar undergrads to spend second semester of sophomore year at Trinity.
She transferred to Yale College as one of the first undergraduate women to matriculate in the College. Her class was the first coed graduating class in Yale’s history. She believes, but cannot prove, that she was the first Yale College graduate to work as a cocktail waitress in the French Quarter.
Continuing this pattern, while studying law at NYU Deborah was one of the first law students to participate in a 4-year joint JD/MPA program with the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, garnering one of the first joint JD/MPA’s from the 2 schools. Some years later she co-created the first-ever consumer show for the pregnancy-through preschool market: “Baby Fair.” Adopting a full-time career as a mediator/arbitrator in 1991, she says that she cannot claim to have been one of the first. But I am hard-set to name one who came before.
So cheers to Deborah. And with no disrespect, let’s join conductor Marin Alsop, who, speaking last year from the podium as the first woman to conduct the “Last Night of the Proms,” yearned for the day when there would be no more “firsts” for women, and dedicated the concert to “the second, third, fourths, fifths, hundredths to come.”
As recently as 1995, the Supreme Court observed, in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, that arbitration was a creature of contract: “[A] party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court’s decision about the merits of its dispute.”
Yet what constitutes an agreement to arbitrate seems to be very much in play since First Options was decided. In that case, owners of an investment company were held to have agreed to arbitrate disputes involving that company, but were held not to have agreed to arbitrate disputes in their personal capacities. The analysis parsed the distinct legal capacities of informed and sophisticated parties, and determined that the same people consented to arbitrate in one capacity, but did not consent to arbitrate in another — and that they had done so intentionally, strategically and with a particular purpose in mind that the courts were bound to respect.
These days, no such informed, strategic and knowing consent to arbitrate is required. Nor is a written agreement required. Consent to arbitration may be found by virtue of an individual’s going to work in the morning. Or it may be found in the act of using a credit card to buy carrots at the A&P.
It can even be found by clicking on a “Buy With 1-Click” button on Amazon (the logic being that the click signifies not just an intent to buy the used watchband advertised on the website, but also informed consent to Amazon’s “Terms of Agreement,” which include a non-negotiated, non-negotiable, obscure, unilaterally propounded waiver of certain rights set forth in consumer protection laws and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Some call this kind of arbitration agreement “cram-down.” Some call it “forced.” Everyone calls in “enforceable.” But none dare call it an “agreement.” I know of no law school that teaches Amazon’s Terms of Agreement in Contracts class.
The heart of the problem, as Tom Stipanowich keeps trying to remind us, is our shared notions of fairness. The notion that your intention in buying carrots at the grocery store, or in arriving at work, is equivalent to an intention to waive legal rights if you later discover that the store is price-fixing or the employer is discriminatory, strikes many, many people as simply unfair. And when that happens, both arbitration and the law itself are undermined.
With this background, comes now the California State Legislature and Governor Brown, who on September 30 of this year enacted and signed a bill titled AB 2617. It provides in part:(1) A person shall not require another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, as a condition of entering into a contract for goods or services…. (2) A person shall not refuse to enter into a contract with, or refuse to provide goods or services to, another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure…. (3) Any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint…. shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of entering into a contract for goods or services or as a condition of providing or receiving goods and services. (4) Any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure…. that is required as a condition of entering into a contract for goods or services shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. (5) Any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of the contract or of providing or receiving the goods or services. It has been noted that the word “arbitration” does not appear in this legislation. The Supreme Court’s lacunae in Concepcion notwithstanding, the Federal Arbitration Act plainly exempts from its scope state-law defenses to agreements that are based on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” and this state law seems to speak to any contract, not just a contract to arbitrate. Now let’s see whether California can protect its citizens from “gotcha” arbitration “agreements” or not.
The October 2014 issue of Dispute Resolution International (the journal of the Dispute Resolution Section of the IBA) features an excellent article by Chicago mediator/arbitrator/attorney Paul Lurie and Swiss/Israeli mediator/attorney Jeremy Lack on “Guided Choice Dispute Resolution Processes: Reducing the Time and Expense to Settlement.” As the title suggests, the logic of the piece stems from the fact that nearly all business disputes are resolved, and that savings are therefore best realized by reducing the time between commencement to resolution.
The starting point for the process that Lurie and Lack recommend is also refreshingly practical: They address disputes at the point of impasse, not at the point of emergence. We are dealing, after all, not with disagreements, but with disputes in which “the parties are deadlocked and unable to reach agreement.” After the threshold decision to engage a facilitator to assist, the first task of that neutral third party is to assist the parties in diagnosing why they were unable to resolve that matter themselves. In that process, “they key protagonists and the stakeholders can take a step back and gain a better mutual understanding of what underlies their past impasses, and how to adjust the settlement process to prevent and overcome further impediments to settlement.”
The process to move forward is, then, a function of the diagnosis. Mediating a narrow negotiation is different from — and can be more expensive than — processes that arise from option-generation with the informed guidance of the facilitator. Collaborative discussions, targeted information exchange, reference of discrete legal issues to narrowly-tailored adjudicative processes, all are custom-selected by the parties in order to overcome obstacles that they themselves have identified. And even if negotiations are suspended during these events, the facilitator remains available to advise, coach, transmit information, and assist either or both of the parties in roles that they themselves define.
The Guided Choice analysis is a valuable one, not only for its simplicity but for its continual reminder that we are dealing, not with a “conflict,” but with a settlement effort that has come to the point of impasse. Identifying the reasons for that impasse, and overcoming obstacles to agreement, defines the role of the facilitator. “By using Guided Choice, the parties can safely explore how to make the best use out of each of the dispute resolution options available to them, and possibly combine them, to reach faster, cheaper and better outcomes.” Indeed, the authors suggest that “the best way to customize arbitration is by using a facilitator as a process mediator who can work independently and confidentially with the parties and the tribunal.”
On Wednesday October 22, 12:50 – 2:15 pm, New York Law School’s ADR Program is offering a reprise of a very successful panel from last April’s ABA Business Law Section meeting in Los Angeles: “Calling All Deal Lawyers: Why Transactional Attorneys Should Get Involved in Dispute Resolution.”
The program features James Freund, Mediator and former partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; Richard Hall, partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; Joan Stearns Johnsen, Mediator and Arbitrator; and Richard Lutringer, Mediator and former partner, Schiff Hardin LLP. The program description notes:
Transactional attorneys are highly trained, highly skilled, and highly experienced in negotiating complicated and sophisticated agreements. Yet too often, when something involving those agreements goes amiss, deal lawyers are not called upon to help resolve the problem. Why is it that, when litigation is threatened or even commenced, the lawyers who know the deal, know the documents, and know the players are not involved in solving the problem? Is it time to give clients more value by getting deal lawyers involved in the resolution of disputes arising from their deals? A light lunch will be served prior to the program.
CLE credits are offered, lunch is served from 12:30 pm, the price is right at $35, and reservations can be made at www.nyls.edu/CallingAllDealLawyers.
Mediation in Italy has for many years seemed like teenage sex — more people talk about it than actually do it, and those who do it, do it poorly.
And it has also been a target for humor, compassion, anti-lawyer spleen-venting, and constitutional mish-mash. It seems that every few months there is another statute, constitutional challenge, administrative edict or judicial pronouncement.
Our good (and good-humored) friend Giuseppe De Palo has directed our attention to a new article on the topic, summarizing the status of things (at least for now — don’t blink). It opens with a quotation from Machiavelli and closes with a comment citing Shakespeare. So you know it’s erudite, at least. And coming from Sr. De Palo, it can hardly be more authoritative.
Christian Fabian of Mayer Brown made a valuable contribution to a discussion at the ABA Business Law Section last month on collaborative legal practices in merger, dissolution and other business contexts. Click here for a posting on that excellent panel.
He has recently written an excellent article titled “Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Is Collaborative Law and Option?” Readers are encouraged to review it for some out-of-the-box, in-the-money ideas on handling post-closing M&A disputes .